EXPERT TESTIMONY-A DISOUSSION.
[As a result of the article on "Expert Testimony," published
in the March number of THE AiERCiEc Lw REGISTER for this
year., the following letters were exchanged between the author
of that article and Judge Penrose of the Orphans' Court of
Philadelphia County. It is believed that they will be found of
interest and value as presenting difMerent views of the actual
and ideal status of the expert; and they are therefore published
as.they come to our hands.-ED.]
I.
CHLTox AND WAY=,

March 19, 1902.

DR. PFRSIFOR FEAZ"r.
Dear Sir:-Please accept my thanks for the copy of "Expert
Testimony, Its Abuses and Uses," which I have read with great
interest.
A good deal of the confusion which exists with regard to the
subject arises, I think, from the expression expert "testimony."
Testimony, as I understand the term, is what is said by one
having personal knowledge of facts as to which he testifieshaving first been sworn to tell them truly; while, on the other
hand, the expert, as the term implies, is one who by reason of
study of the subject, or from long experience, observation, etc.,
is able to form an opinion,upon facts disclosed by the testimony
of others or in evidence, in some way, before the court or jury,
which, by reason of such superior knowledge, etc., on his part, is
received for the purpose of aiding the court or jury in reaching
a proper conclusion.
Of course, the value of the opinion, depends upon how far the
person expressing it shows himself to have superior knowledge,in other words, that he really is expert. But in any case he
simply gives an opinion; and, as he does not testify to facts, a
conviction for perjury would be impossible.
Opinion may be mistaken; facts cannot be: and if the opinions
are in conflict with the facts, as established by the testimony of
witnesses whose credibility cannot be questioned, the ordinary
judge or jury would not be likely to be influenced by the opinion,
no matter how eminent the expert or how manifest his impartiality and sincerity.
In my judgment the expert is-and"should be so regardedsimply a scientific advocate, associated with the legal advocate,
of the party on whose behalf he appears in the case.
Sincerely yours,
[Signed.]
OIMMENT B. PENRosE.
MARCOH 20, 1902.
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HON. CLEMENT B. PENmoSE,
GERMANTOWN.

Dear Sir:-Your notice of my article is appreciated. I feel
sure you will absolve me from suspicion of egotism or interested
motive for adding a word on behalf of the thousands of conscientious professional men, whose acquired knowledge in situations where accurate information is necessary is, and must ever
be, used by the courts; as the experience of a guide must be used
in an unknown country by officers of the law in pursuit of a
criminal. The best representatives of this class feel their position to be one of serious responsibility, and from the time they
enter the witness-box owe allegiance only to the truth (as the
object), and the court (as the instrument of attaining - that
object), no matter who pays their fees. If there be expert witnesses who are partisans, it is because it is the interest of attorneys
that there should be such witnesses. Only a few weeks ago I was
reproached by an attorney who had retained me, because in giving my conclusions (which were favorable to his side) I specified
precisely the amount of material which had been given me on
which to base a judgment. I have little doubt that the conclusions I arrived at would have been emphasized if, in answer
to my repeated requests, more standards had been provided,
but they were not. The jury found against the client of the
attorney just mentioned (on quite other grounds than any with
which I had to do) and the latter asked me with much indignatiofi, 'Why did you expose to my opponent that you had but two
standards ?" I replied, "Because it was true, important, and
might not have been brought out in cross-examination." "That
is not my idea of an expert," said he. Nor is it the idea of the
majority of members of the bar: if it were, the tacit assumption
that expert conclusions are for sale would not be so generally
entertained.
I have expressed in the article published in TnE AnncAN
LAw REGISTER, in December, 1898,- as well as in my book,
"Bibliotics," and elsewhere, that for me the true expert must
be simply an amicus curier. If he be a disguised special counsel,
or as you call it a "scientific advocate," he is an expert fighter,
a case winner,-what you will,--but not an expert in its highest
and best sense. The distinction is like that between the torpedo
boat and the torpedo-boat destroyer; or still better, between a
judge and an advocate.
Outside of legal definition and usage, about which I am not
entitled to an opinion, I repudiate the idea of advocacy in an
expert; or that he does not testify to facts as much as an eyewitness; or that he should not be as liable as any other liar to
prosecution for perjury if he knowingly misstates. The opinion
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which results from an examination of a subject by an expert
is a fact as much as any occurrence, and if he deliberately denies
holding such an opinion, he is (outside of the legal definitions) a
perjurer and a criminal. I confess I cannot understand the legal
restriction of an expert's examination to opinion.
Suppose the question is as to whether a piece of steel contained, as required by contract, less than three-hundredths of one
per cent of phosphorus. Does not the chemist who weighs out
and testifies to the actual amount testify as to a fact? Does
not the bacteriologist who detects and, proves by cultures the
micro-organism typical of a certain disease testify to a fact?
Has not an eminent English judge said that a state of mind is
a fact?
There is but one truth and but one best method of attaining
it, whether it be called rules or evidence, or the scientific method.
I speak only from experience with the latter in expressing my
conviction that proof by various converging circumstantial lines,
which have been rigidly scrutinized, is indefinitely stronger than
eye-witness evidence, which after all is opinion evidence to the
extent that it is an interpretation of what seemed to be a visual
impression. The danger of error through one illusion is greater
than where any other than the state of things represented by the
conclusion would leave twenty circumstances with their ends in
the air like a disarranged Chinese puzzle.
Very sincerely and respectfully,
[Signed.]
PERSIFoR FRAZER.
I.
CHELTON AND WAYE,

March 21, 1902.

Du. Pm
E sioR FRAzEn.
My Dear Sir:.-A scientific man may, of course, testify to
facts, as in the case of percentage of phosphorus in a piece of
steel, suggested in your note of yesterday, which reached me
this morning, or that of the quantity of coal taken from a mine,
referred to in your very instructive essay; but in so doing,
though his scientific knowledge has taught him how to ascertain
the fact, he testifies to the fact, thus ascertained, and not to a
mere opinion,-and, therefore, not as an expert but as an ordinary witness. In such case if he testifies falsely he can be
indicted and convicted of perjury. But when he asserts that in
his opinion a testator was of unsound-mind, or that what purports to be the signature of one whom he has never known is, in
his opinion, simulated, how would it be possible-though his
moral guilt would be no less--to convict him of perjury, no
matter how untrue the assertion may be?
If the expert could act simply as amicus ouria, or amicus
juratorun (for he is generally called in to express his opinion
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as to questions of fact), or if he could be regarded as in a
judicial position, there would be, unquestionably, the great
advantage of impartiality and freedom from bias; but in the
latter case, there would have to be an appellate court of scientific men to review his judgments, just as a court of lawyers
reviews the judgment of the legal judge; while in the former
case, it would not do to deprive the party against whom the
scientific opinion is pronounced of the opportunity of contradicting the soundness of the opinion or showing by cross-examination the want of knowledge of the person expressing it, or the
illogical method by which his conclusion was deduced from his
premises.
As advocate, he will convince, if his reasons are sound, just
as the legal advocate does when he shows that the facts and the
law are as he asserts.
Sincerely yours,
[Signed.]
CLEMENT B. PENROSE.
IV.
MARCH 22, 1902.
HoN. CLEMENT B. PENmOSE, •

GERMANTOwN.
Dear Sir:-The reply you were good enough to make to my
letter brings us face to face with one of the most difficult problems in the expert question, which is: "Who is to be the judge
of whether certain testimony is fact or opinion ?"
Before the perfection of Bertillon's system of measuring criminals, those most competent to judge admitted that where the identification of an individual was only through a general impression
of his features in the minds of his nearest relatives and friends,
numerous instances kept recurring where it failed. Even where
some personal peculiarity (a broken tooth, a mole, and the like)
was known to exist, this peculiarity, or a few such, had been
found upon the falsely identified person. In \the absence of
some very extraordinary peculiarity, or a large number of small
ones, it may be sai4 that, up to the application of Bertillon's
system, identification of a person was a matter of opinion and
not of fact. Bertillon simply enormously multiplied the details
which were made the basis of an identification, measuring the
lengths and breadths of the separate parts of the body, until
such an anatomical formula was reached as no human being has
ever duplicated. The chance of any other thing possessing all
these peculiarities being represented "as millions against one,
it is considered practically "certain" that one who furnishes
measurements exactly corresponding to a given recora is the
individual of whom the record is made. By this advance in
method the ques.tion has ceased to be one of opinion and has
become one of -fact.
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Incidentally it may be said the person who makes the original
measurements of a given record is no more capable than any
other of identifying the original by means of that record. Nevertheless, it is thinkable a court would hold that in spite of exact
correspondence in all the details between a suspected individual
and a record, the identification was merely "opinion."
What Bertillon has done for human beings I have endeavored to
do for handwriting; i. e., multiply the details subjeeted to measurement and description, so that correspondence in a large number of them (especially in those which record themselves independently of the will) is impossible, unless their origin be identical.
In the cases where this can be successfully done, and they are
many, the identification of authorship of handwriting is not any
less "certainty" than the other. Frequently seeing a person write
is not of the slightest assistance in reaching a conclusion as to
the genuineness of a given writing. As in the first case the
chance of an error in the conclusion is, under the circumstances
above mentioned and frequently realized, one in many millions.
The constant advance of science, and perfection of methods
and apparatus, is continually lifting subjects out of the realm
of opinion into that of fact, but of course the administration
of justice must keep prudently far in the rear of the-pioneers.
Your objection to the appointment of court experts you will
find stated in the first edition of my "Bibliotics," before referred
to, and third edition, p. 237, Appendix F, and almost in the
same language in numerous papers since. On account of that
objection I drafted the present law of 1895. Instead of attempting to exclude all experts but one, who might becomhe an intolerable tyrant, I sought to leave the litigants free to call as many
as they chose, but to make the conditions such that none but
the competent could appear in the witness-box. Unfortunately,
it is not possible to provide against moral delinquency. In the
bill which the Bar Association is preparing for enactment,
and about which Judge McPherson did me the honor to ask my
views of certain parts in which I am entitled to hold any, I
have tried to perpetuate this feature.
It is a nebulous, uncertain, and ever changing line which separates what the court calls "opinion" and "fact." In truth, the
belief of the court in the reality of such a distinction is opinion
and not fact; and, anyhow, all that we can know of any "fact'"
is that it is an "opinion" held by many or few persons, and this
includes even the great first fact, Cogito ergo sum, which as
regards incontrovertibility is in a class all by itself.
Very respectfully,
PERSIFOR FRAZER.

